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Transborder Regions — the Yalta Logic
Central Europe or, more exactly, Central and Eastern Europe as we 
perceive it today, in the year 1997, on the political map of the continent, 
is the outcome of numerous political processes, the consequences of which 
are experienced by the nations inhabiting that part of the continent, albeit 
those nations hardly ever have been asked their opinion regarding their 
belonging to one state or another, since the beginning of the 20th century. 
As has been emphasized oftentimes, when analysing the identity processes 
in Central and Eastern Europe, the 20th century is the century of determining 
borders in that part of Europe as a result of implementing the great European 
or global politics, with no respect whatsoever for the sense of national 
attachment of the nations inhabiting the region (Wódz J., 1994). Hence the 
grave problem of national minorities that is observed there, the problem of 
regions divided by state borders, hence also the vision of State-Nations 
(Etat-Nation) implemented forcefully by the creators of the post-Versailles 
Europe, meant to correspond with the political experiences of Western 
Europe, which were never shared by Eastern Europe. That Eastern Europe 
(and especially its easternmost part) had never had a chance to develop 
its identity, throughout the 19th century (Hobsbawm, 1989), having 
been controlled by the three empires: Germany, Russia, and Austro-Hungary. 
The feeble post-Versailles states had neither time nor possibility, throughout 
the twenty years between the end of World War I and the beginning of 
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World War II, to develop structures of state that would have regard 
for national or regional differences. Thus, the whole interwar period was 
abound with conflicts related to minority problems, to divided regions, to 
small regional and local groups which felt dominated by a majority in a given 
state.
The logic of Yalta appears somewhat different. There the issue was the 
division into influence zones between the three great powers. Still, again no 
question was asked regarding the borders of nations inhabiting that part of the 
continent, moreover, large-scale migrations became compulsory, resulting in 
enormous human tragedies and affecting normal relations between states up to 
this day. The zone given by the three great powers under Soviet control 
additionally underwent the processes of “Stalinisation”, enhancing total 
absence of any identity debates. Apparently efficiently organized “socialist 
states” in the zone of Soviet influences, were in fact extremely centralised, thus 
naturally no regional debate could take place there. The consequences of that 
“tying up identity or regional debate” could have been observed as early 
as in the 1970s in Poland, mainly in Upper Silesia (Wódz J., Wódz K., 
1993). Using the example of that very region we would like to indicate what 
further consequences that had for trans-border regions in Central and Eastern 
Europe.
To begin with, we still need to differentiate between three types of regions 
which in Central and Eastern Europe constitute a grave social and political 
problem. The appearance of those three types of regions, in connection with 
the “regional issue” (that is social and political problems related to regional 
identity revindications) constitutes a distinctive feature of contemporary 
Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, here are those three types of regions where 
the “regional issue” appears. They are:
a. border regions (sometimes referred to as borderland ones), namely 
regions whose territory and population are within one state, but where the 
regional border is also a state border. In order to define the sense of belonging 
to such a region, an essential element is the treatment of the state border as one 
that separates the territory belonging to “others”, not only in the sense of 
character differing regionally, but also nationally and state-wise. Usually such 
regions develop some specific (or even pathologic at times) forms of pat­
riotism.
b. transborder regions. They result in an obvious manner from the logic 
applied in Yalta and Versailles. They are quite common in Central and Eastern 
Europe. These are historic regions in the sociological sense (unity of territory, 
also considering its symbolic sense, shared history, culture, social institutions, 
lifestyle, etc.) divided by state borders (Wódz J., Wódz K., 1995). Most 
often the borders divide them into two parts, which means that one part of the 
region belongs to one state, while the other to another state, yet there are also 
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cases of such historic regions belonging to three states. The basic social 
problem faced by such transborder regions is that of the relation between 
the population of a given region and the population of the rest of the country 
(thus always at least two countries are involved), while the crucial political 
problem is that of defining the population of such region in the categories 
of minority (national, cultural, linguistic, etc.). Examples of complications 
which in the interwar period bothered the international relations in Europe, 
and which were due exactly to the relations between majority and minorities, 
so indirectly also from the fact that transborder regions existed (not all 
minorities need to be connected with transborder regions, whereas all 
transborder regions are invariably the incipience of political problems related 
to the existence of minorities), such examples are evident enough, so no further 
evidence for the existence of the problem needs to be indicated.
c. regions of transborder character. They are also specific for Central 
and Eastern Europe. They have appeared after 1945 and embrace those 
regions which in the times before World War II constituted transborder 
regions. The resolutions made in Yalta, concerning moving of borders and 
huge migrations of people, resulted in such regions (transborder before) being 
situated within the territory of one state (not always finding themselves 
situated near borders, though, as the border shifts were so great that 
sometimes the former transborder regions have found themselves far from 
state borders), yet retaining traces of their former transborder character. Those 
traces consist mainly of the remains of those spheres of social life which have 
depended on the activities of public institutions (e.g. the system of education, 
social care, the functioning of public administration in general, labour law, 
organization of work, etc.).
Regions of transborder character can be found all over Europe, yet 
their peculiar character in Central and Eastern Europe is due to the social 
and political practice of the years 1945—1989/1990. That fact that through­
out that time, which was the totalitarian period for that part of the continent, 
any debates on regional attachment had been tied up (as the centralist vision of 
state and the theory of national and ethnic homogeneity within state was 
obligatory, at least in Poland such was the official doctrine, since early 1970s), 
resulted in the fact that the differences between former divisions between states 
within regions, instead of disappearing or merely losing importance in the 
course of social practice within the borders of one state, underwent the tying 
up process. We shall see subsequently, what consequences that brought about 
after the overthrowing of totalitarianism after 1989/1990.
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The Renaissance of Regional Identity in Poland and in 
Central and Eastern Europe after 1989
The downfall of the totalitarian era, although taking different course in 
different states, invariably had similar consequences for the issue that is of 
interest for us. Namely, the overthrowing of censorship and establishment of 
democratic principles to govern public life led to a serious debate on identity 
and, what followed, to the formulation of political and social regional 
revindications (Wódz K., 1994). Specific examples of the above are the 
identity debates in Upper Silesia, which region has been the subject of our 
empirical research (Wódz K., ed., 1995).
However, before proceeding to discuss the phenomenon of the renaissance 
of regional identity in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989, a phenomenon 
of more general nature is worth pointing out. This is emphasized in order 
to avoid a quite common yet totally false proposition that the form of 
regional revindications in Central Europe after 1989 is something utterly 
specific or even, as some claim, is a simple consequence of leaving totalitaria­
nism behind. Such a general statement can find neither proof nor justification. 
To substantiate the above, two reasonably widespread works of Michel 
Maffesoli, a French sociologist, will be mentioned (Maffesoli, 1992; 
Maffesoli, 1993). Maffesoli, when analyzing societies of Western Europe, 
announced the end of the social individualism epoch, which has been replaced 
by communotarism or even tribalism (the latter being an expression used by 
Michel Maffesoli himself). Generally speaking, the phenomenon in question 
consists of the domination of revindications of communities or homogeneous 
social groups (including territorial ones, such as regions) over preserving 
civil rights of individuals. That tribalism, as Maffesoli labels that phenomenon, 
on the one hand is a social power possessed by such communities (“we are 
stronger when we come out as members of homogeneous social groups”, this 
often grants mental power to feeble individuals who would not be able to 
formulate their revindications themselves), on the other hand it provides ways 
of organizing those communities, as it proves easy to gain charismatic 
leadership over them. Phenomena of such a kind can indeed be observed in 
principally all historic regions of Central and Eastern Europe, while the 
peculiar situation of that part of the continent lies in the fact that civil society 
is absent there, that no democratic attitudes can be noticed, that institutions 
whose aim is to defend civil rights are inefficient, briefly speaking those 
societies abide in the proto-democratic period. Hence, the regional identity 
renaissance in Central Europe after 1989 has been highly charged with 
communotarism, and has shown clearly not enough respect for civil rights of 
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individual citizens. Anyway, that point can be relatively easily carried by 
indicating three elements of the regional identity renaissance present in that 
part of the continent:
a. the exclusive character of the notion of identity (division into “our folk”, 
deriving from the region, and “others” or “strangers”, thus actually making 
reference to the ethnic understanding of region);
b. the type of regional leadership, usually based upon “regional ideology” 
by which notion one should understand the building of the picture of 
the region in bright colours only, while accusing the majority in a given 
state of bad intentions towards that region (which invariably constitutes 
a minority);
c. relying merely on selected excerpts from the past, coupled with a lack of 
prospective vision for the region. In social and political practice that entailed 
continual reference to the wrong experienced in the past by the population of 
the region (which population was often defined as a minority harmed by 
majority), as well as absence of thinking about the future perceived as common 
future shared in the own country, in the specific part of the continent, 
also in Europe as a whole. Indeed, this constitutes a limitation of perspectives 
for the social development of the region. One may ask here why that vision of 
region, autodestructive as it in fact is, has been so frequently approved in the 
course of processes of regional identity revival in countries of Central Europe 
after 1989. There is basically one answer to such a question, a political answer, 
not a sociological one: it happens so because such a traditional vision of the 
region, vision based upon analysing the wrong suffered in the past, serves well 
the type of charismatic leadership prevailing there, or based upon the 
traditional role of institutions of regional character (e.g. the role of the Church 
in Upper Silesia).
What has been mentioned above shall explain the numerous difficulties met 
when implementing, in that part of the continent, the idea of cooperation 
between regions in Europe, as such cooperation assumes a prospective 
definition of a region, as well as respecting civil rights of individuals (which is 
in conflict with the community-oriented, ethnic vision proclaimed by traditio­
nally-minded leaders).
When discussing the renaissance of regional identity in Central Europe, one 
cannot forget a major factor, namely that of economy. After 1989, the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe underwent a transformation from 
planned economy, dominating for a few dozens of years, to free market 
economy. For many historic regions, such a transformation implied changes of 
their economic functions and their economic importance for the country. 
Usually those changes have been adverse for their position (although one may 
find exceptional examples when the position changed favourably, e.g. in case 
of some regions situated near borders, where foreign trade allowed to generate 
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additional and sometimes substantial income). Thus, the reviving regional 
identity has gained additional components, economic ones (besides historic, 
cultural, linguistic, religious, etc., present before). Today one can venture an 
opinion that economic content constitutes an important part in the set of 
regional revindications in Central and Eastern Europe.
Cultural Specificity of Transborder Regions in Poland
When analyzing that issue, one should start from a short reminder of the 
changes that Polish borders underwent in the 20th century, as without it it 
would be utterly pointless to describe transborder regions of Poland. Let us 
begin by stating that Poland, which had been absent from the political map of 
Europe throughout the 19th century, worked out having been partitioned 
between the occupants (Germany, Russia, Austro-Hungary) a specific model 
of national identity. A romantic and extremely centralised model it was. A few' 
words of explanation seem necessary to explain the above notions. Thus, the 
romanticism of the Polish identity resulting from the fact that the country 
lacked its own state (namely its territory and institutions), in short consisted of 
the fact that the whole population has been supposed to accept (such was the 
assumption) a certain set of common national symbols, the role of which has 
been of much higher order than that of everyday reality. In turn, the 
centralised character of that model consists of indicating the most crucial 
symbolic focal points for the whole nation (hence the extreme symbolic role of 
the capital, Warsaw, or the equally crucial role of the sanctuary in Częs­
tochowa where the Virgin Mary is worshipped), ignoring at the same time the 
importance of regional symbols or focal points for local population. In such 
a situation, after 1918 the Poland that emerged as a result of the Versailles 
Treaty had been a country contained within its inter-war borders, which 
contained many transborder regions, holding at the same time to the 
romantic and centralised model of regional identity, which clearly had not 
invited solving regional questions. The most important transborder region, 
causing also greatest problems for the inter-war Poland, was that of Upper 
Silesia, situated within the borders of Poland, Germany, and partly also 
those of Czechoslovakia. The eastern Polish border at that time marked 
a few transborder regions of which basically one (on the border between 
Poland and Lithuania) caused serious social and political problems. Other 
eastern transborder regions (Polesie, Wołyń, Bukowina, etc.) brought about no 
considerable problems, mainly because of the fact that the local populations 
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then there could not boast any well developed national identity, defining 
themselves oftentimes solely through their local attachment.
After 1945, when Polish borders were shifted substantially indeed, the 
situation was much different. Following the decisions taken in Yalta, the 
eastern territories of Poland, belonging to that country before 1939, were 
given to the Soviet Union, while Poland took over a considerable part of the 
former Eastern Prussia, the whole of Upper Silesia, a substantial part of Lower 
Silesia, as well as of Pomerania. That crucial shift of borders (at some places 
the shift comprised moving the borders over 500 km in the East—West 
direction) resulted in forcing huge migrations of people which, in the 
humanitarian dimension, were overwhelming tragedies for the people forced to 
migrate. The planned movements of population of big towns resulted, for 
example, in having a considerable percentage of the population of Lvov 
moved to the town of Wroclaw. The recourse to the symbolism of former 
regions ceased to exist while, as generation passed, symbolism relating to new 
regions got established. The Poles who were born in Wroclaw or Szczecin felt 
even more related to their respective regions, being at the same time unaware 
(due to living within a totalitarian state) of the fact that Germans were expelled 
from those regions.
Basically, there had been no serious debate in Poland, regarding transbor­
der regions, prior to 1989/1990. Soon after 1989, however, when the freedom 
to express thoughts was restored, the phenomenon of regional identity 
renaissance, described before, got established, transborder regions got redis­
covered. The paradox to which we shall devote the forthcoming part of the 
paper, consists of the fąct that Upper Silesia, the major Polish transborder 
region from before 1939, found itself belonging almost entirely to Poland, and 
gained, in the classification employed by us, the status not of a transborder 
region, but of a region of transborder character. At the same time, real 
(and to some degree fresh) transborder regions of Poland appeared within 
its present borders. They are all situated along either the eastern border 
or the eastern part of the southern border of Poland. On one hand, this is 
a result of the border shift (decided in Yalta), on the other hand they 
originated in the mass forced migrations dating back to the end of World War 
II. Today’s transborder regions of Poland (with two exceptions, namely the 
Poprad river region, inhabited by Slovak population, and the region around 
the town of Sejny, where the population cultivates Lithuanian cultural 
traditions) are in a sense the result of enhanced regional and national identity 
of the population from the Byelorussia and Ukraine borderland. As recently 
as 50 years ago, those people referred to themselves using the terms of local 
identity, while at present they gained national identity, and the regions 
inhabited by those people (e.g. the region of Ukrainian borderland near the 
town of Przemyśl) have gained the status of transborder regions, as for today. 
Jacek Wódz, Kazimiera Wódz
What constitutes the cultural specificity of those new transborder regions of 
Poland? Mainly that dynamism characterising the formation of regional 
identity, the latter being at the stage of definition completion, of coming true in 
the relationships with majorities (on both sides of the border). Thus, those 
regions may provide instances of aggressive and extreme revindications, which 
constitute a peculiar test of how far one can go in revindications addressed to 
the two states located on the two sides of the border.
The appearance of those new transborder regions also has some grave 
consequences for the policy of Poland, and for that canon of Polish national 
identity which is rooted in romanticism. In Poland, as well as in other “new 
democracies” of Central and Eastern Europe, there appear some political 
opinions, along with small political parties of exclusive, traditional, and 
national character (in Poland among such parties one can list ZChN 
— Christian-National Union, or KPN — Confederation for an Independent 
Poland). For parties of such a kind the fact that national identity develops in 
transborder regions is a proof that Polish national tradition gets neglected, and 
that Polish reasons of State are under threat. All parties of such a kind are 
anti-European in general (in the sense that they are against joining the 
European Union by Poland), for them the word “European” has a clearly 
pejorative meaning. The development of regional identity in transborder 
regions, questioning the old, traditional sense of state borders, is subject to 
attacks directed mainly at regional leaders and regional organizations. The 
result of such attacks is that the fresh identity of transborder regions develops 
in a conflict-prone situations, being highly politicised (that is the specific 
reaction to attacks by nationalist parties), often pushing true reflections upon 
culture into background. On the other hand, that very context of renaissance 
or simply emergence of regional identity in transborder regions results in the 
fact that those regions are involved in the national debate upon Polish national 
identity and future relations between Poland and other members of the 
European Union.
The Example of Upper Silesia
It has already been mentioned earlier and repeatedly that the region that 
we particularly focus upon is the region of Upper Silesia. That is a traditional 
industrial region, which in the interwar period used to be a classical example 
of a transborder region, while nowadays when the Polish state borders had 
been shifted, has become a region of transborder character. That region, 
a very important region of mining and traditional heavy industry (metallurgy, 
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metal industries, etc.) was historically linked with Austria and Germany, while 
the Versailles Treaty resulted in making it a transborder region (Wanato- 
wicz, 1994). Since 1945 that region has belonged almost entirely to Poland 
(except for some small parts located in the Polish-Czech and Polish-Slovak 
borderlands), yet it preserved both its specific culture and some traces of 
divisions dating back to the times when it used to be a transborder region. It is 
in that sense that it can be treated as a region of transborder character. To that 
extent, an enormous role was played by World War II, and the policy of Nazi 
Germany (so-called Volkslisten). Later, in 1970s, that was followed by 
considerable waves of emigration from that region to Germany. As a result, 
today’s situation is such that in the territories which in the interwar period had 
a significant German minority, nowadays there is a large percentage of Upper 
Silesian families with relatives living in the Federal Republic of Germany. That 
fact ensures that we deal with a region of transborder character, as such 
a phenomenon is absent from that part of the region (due to the lack of any 
strict definition of the region, we are forced to use statistics applying to the 
Katowice Province) which either had not belonged to Germany prior to 1939, 
or had no German minority.
Before proceeding to discuss some findings of our empirical research, we 
need to stress the importance of the collapse of traditional industries for the 
regional consciousness (Wódz K., ed., 1994). Namely, the regional conscious­
ness comprises numerous connections, both purely social ones (e.g. the type of 
education received, type of profession, traditional family structure), and 
symbolic ones, with the traditional dominating professions of miner, metallur­
gist, or metal industry worker. Today, the renaissance of regional identity 
collides in the region with the awareness of collapse of traditional heavy 
industries and mining. One may not forget that when analysing that specific 
case of a region of transborder character.
There is no room here to analyse the history of regional consciousness of 
Silesians. Let us merely mention that history (particularly starting from 
mid 18th century, that is from the time when industrialization of the region 
started) taught them a specific pragmatism, oftentimes they prefer to define 
themselves by stating their belonging to the region, than by stating their 
nationality (Polish, German or, in the very south of the region, Czech). 
Research conducted in the early 1990s in the Katowice Province by a team 
headed by Kazimiera Wódz (Wódz K. ed., 1995, a) indicated that among the 
inhabitants of that province (comprising today most of the historic region of 
Upper Silesia) three national identifications: Polish, German, and Silesian, 
were indicated as attachment. Those who identified themselves as Silesians go 
beyond the local or regional associations to much lesser degree than those 
who identified themselves as Poles or Germans (although the latter were 
definitely the smallest in numbers). Thus Silesians are definitely most often 
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related solely to local or regional perspective. It should be remembered, 
however, discussions upon regional identity were locked up in the years 
1945—1989, and everybody was simply considered a Pole. It was only after 
1989 the process of revival of regional belonging started, being linked with 
a widespread debate upon various regional revindications (together with 
projects of peculiar regional autonomy within the Polish state). There have 
been two faces of that debate: political and socio-cultural one. We are 
particularly interested in the latter, yet the former should not be totally 
neglected either. Thus we shall begin with a very concise reminder of the 
crucial political elements of that debate. The political character of both the 
identity debate and some regional revindications in Upper Silesia may be 
reduced to three facts:
a. in Upper Silesia the outdated character of the Polish romantic and 
centralistic model of national identity is stressed for that region, due to which 
regional revindications are treated there, from a purely political point of view, 
as struggle against that canon of national identity of Poles that reaches for 
romanticism and centralism;
b. local elites do not find ground to fulfill their political ambitions at the 
national level, thus a specific political ghetto gets formed at the regional level, 
which causes models of political careers to rely more on demonstrating the 
belonging to the region than is the case in other parts of the country;
c. the regional political life focuses (apart from two regional branches of 
nationwide political parties) upon two specific proto-parties of regional 
character. Those proto-parties (Movement for Silesian Autonomy, Upper 
Silesian Association) are organizations acting as regional associations on 
everyday basis, yet during election campaigns they put forward candidates and 
formulate political programmes (invariably confined to the region), active 
during election campaigns. After elections are over, they settle back to the 
rhythm of activity that is typical for social associations.
All the above three elements result in Upper Silesia having a separate 
political quality in comparison with the rest of the country. Our chief interest 
lies, however, in the socio-cultural shape of regional revindications in Upper 
Silesia. In the process of revival of regional identity, the specific social space of 
the region was very clearly referred to (Wodz J., ed., 1990). The region is 
highly urbanized, with towns in which social space has been organized in 
a specific way. Besides traditional town and city centres, those towns comprise 
old working class settlements (so-called familoki, family houses, somewhat 
similar in their organization to the so-called corons in North-Eastern France) 
inhabited by people employed in one specific enterprise (usually a mine or 
steelworks). That method of space organization enabled the survival in those 
settlements of Silesian population of Polish origin, speaking the peculiar Polish 
dialect referred to there as “Silesian speech”. Town and city centres, usually 
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being the residence of administration (first German, to be followed by Polish 
one, yet clerks were not of Upper Silesian origin, thus spoke literary Polish, 
clearly distinct from the Silesian dialect) have been (and are often still being) 
treated as “foreign” space, as “home” space was exclusively that inside the 
worker settlement. Such a method of organization of space resulted in 
long-lasting worker tradition, which today is the basis for the cultural identity 
of the region, whose elites excluded themselves from those groups, by 
abandoning the dialect and taking to literary German or Polish. That dialect, 
clearly originating from old Polish, contains numerous words of German 
origin, oftentimes deformed. Words of German origin are particularly nume­
rous in Silesian dialect in the sphere related to work or official contact with 
authorities and administration. The Polish dialect also testified to the once 
transborder character of the region. As for today, such a cultural fact indicates 
the lack of cultural elites in the region, as well as identity oriented chiefly 
towards the past. One can even indicate a certain fear linked with looking 
towards the future. All those issues create numerous difficulties for moder­
nizing cultural life in the region, and add to complicating the dialogue with the 
majority constituting the rest of the country.
Another element of culture is the emphasizing the importance of origin 
from a family deeply rooted in Silesia, that is relying on understanding 
regional culture in purely ethnic terms. This results in a sharp distinction 
between “our folks” and “strangers” (Wódz K., ed., 1993). Naturally, there 
are numerous nuances applied to this division in everyday life yet, for example, 
it is not without importance in choosing one’s spouse, “trans-regional” 
marriages being still not so frequent, which justifies the opinion that certain 
cultural elements of the division into “our folks” and “strangers” shall persist 
in the generation to come.
Yet another element of culture is also worth pointing out, namely the 
relative character of cultural relations with both Polish culture, and (although 
to a much lesser degree) with German culture. Research of purely qualitative 
character (Rakocz, Wódz, 1996) indicates that the basis for cultural 
identification is still provided by regional identification, in reference to Polish 
culture as the dominating culture in the state, but also with reference 
(particularly among elderly inhabitants of the region) to certain elements of 
German culture (related in particular to organization of work and public life). 
The research quoted above, carried out under the supervision of Kazimiera 
Wódz, indicates that even those Silesians who clearly associate themselves 
with Polish identity (labelling themselves as Silesians-Poles) feel but a little 
distance towards German culture (Wódz K., ed., 1995, a). Depending 
on the context of situation, close relations with either Polish culture or 
elements of German culture are stressed. Speaking their own dialect (a dialect 
clearly based upon Polish language) Silesians as a rule speak bad German, 
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or do not speak it at all. They learn literary Polish at schools, while in contacts 
with family members who live in the Federal Republic of Germany they use 
their own dialect, exclusively. The feature of situational relativity of their 
identity and language towards Polish culture, as well as partly towards 
German culture, may be their specific capital in relations with other regions 
(which local elites understand), but may also be a reason why they are 
reluctant towards contacts with other regions and why they enter a specific 
cultural ghetto.
New Perspectives
All the transborder regions of Poland are familiar with the strategy of 
developing regions through their cooperation in Europe (Charpentier, 
Engel, eds., 1992). For local elites it constitutes a specific model to be applied 
in their own strategies for regional development. It should be stressed, 
however, that that type of logic undergoes most advanced development and 
enjoys most down-to-earth applications in Polish-German and German-Czech 
borderlands (L e p e s a n t, 1996). A good example of such development can be 
seen in agreement, signed in December 1996, between Polish and Czech 
communes/municipalities on the formation of an Euro-region in the area of 
Kłodzko, bearing a Latin name of “Euroregio Glacensis” (Rzeczpospolita, 
1996). Is it, then, possible to employ for the development of regional 
development the model known as “Euroregions” for all transborder regions of 
Poland? The issue appears highly complicated, as we deal with three different 
situations:
a. the Polish-German border is in fact a border between European Union 
and Poland, a country associated with the Union. The “Euroregion” solutions 
may thus be applied as defined by European Union, financial and or­
ganizational support of the Union may also be considered;
b. it is possible to adapt the “Euroregion” logic along the Polish-Czech and 
Polish-Slovak borders, as all the three states, being associated with European 
Community, have indirectly acknowledged the logic of regional development 
applied by the Union. Moreover, the Union itself proposes a few aid and 
support programmes to be used when developing cooperation in transborder 
regions located along the Polish-Czech border (cf. the “Euroregio Glacensis” 
example), or along the Polish-Slovak border;
c. the situation along the Polish eastern border is somewhat different. 
The relations between Poland and its eastern or north-eastern neighbours 
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are of more complicated character, also the cooperation within the transborder 
regions being established there proves not so easy. Anyway, the attempts to 
adjust the “Euroregion” model to that cooperation should be noted, although 
experiences in this respect appear not to be of the best kind. For a few years 
now work has been going on to implement the idea of the Karpaty 
(Carpathians) Euroregion (Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Romania to be 
involved), yet a few serious obstacles have been encountered (e.g. absence 
of traditions to cooperate, political treatment of the project within each 
of the prospective partners, lack of legal basis for independence to be granted 
to communes/municipalities as regards international contacts, etc.). On the 
other hand, however, emphasis needs to be put to the considerable increase 
in trade over the Polish borders with eastern neighbours, which trade slowly 
but surely makes cooperation between communes/municipalities situated along 
the border a necessity as, in a political sense of the word, a true lobby may 
arise.
A separate form of cooperation consists of the initiatives undertaken by 
associations of communes/municipalities in transborder regions, or regions of 
transborder character (Wódz J., 1996). The Association of Communes from 
Upper Silesia and Northern Moravia, a grassroots organization established by 
the communes/municipalities themselves, comprising both Polish and Czech 
communes, may serve as an example here. That organization, without any 
public title (being an association of communes) is in fact a lobby pestering 
local administrations to consider transborder cooperation in their plans for 
development.
The considerable amount of initiatives, coinciding with the revival of 
awareness among transborder regions, allow to believe that the social function 
of state borders may change, at least in the awareness of Poles (but also 
Czechs, Germans, Slovaks, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, and Russians). It is still 
a border that divides and separates, not a border which but delineates the area 
where certain laws are in force, separating neither cultures nor people (as is the 
case in those regions of Western Europe that are of transborder character).
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